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ABSTRACT 
This paper intends to analyze the association between NBA statistics and winning 
percentage and determine if that same relationship holds for player compensation and individual 
player statistics. To determine the associations, two separate multiple regressions are utilized 
during the NBA seasons, 2013-2014 and 2014-2015. This paper finds that teams are not 
effectively compensating players, with more analytical inclined front offices being more 
effective at compensating players.  
KEYWORDS: NBA, Salary, Effective Allocation, Regression, and Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
INTRODUCTION 
 The National Basketball Association is a collection of thirty professional basketball 
teams in the United States and Canada. It is currently the third largest professional sports league 
in North America with approximately $5 billion dollars in revenue.1 Also, the National 
Basketball Association distributes a significant amount of salary to its players, which adds to the 
intrigue of the game. Each team had a salary cap $63 million in 2014-2015, which is a soft limit 
of how much salary that a team can distribute to its roster before having to pay penalties.2 3 With 
the sheer size and interest in the National Basketball Association, scholars and fans alike have an 
interest on the salaries of the National Basketball Association players.  
The question of whether or not National Basketball Association players are paid enough 
has often been about the perspective according to scholars. Frank Scott, James Long and Ken 
Somppi (1985) say that the discussion was previously more qualitative in nature. In their study, 
Scott et al. found that fans and owners believed that National Basketball Association players 
were overpaid.4 These fans appeared to believe that National Basketball Association players did 
not deserve their salaries because National Basketball Association players could be paid millions 
of dollars more than the average person.5 While common fans believe that players were overpaid 
based on qualitative and relative examinations, economists disagree. Previously, with restrictions 
in labor markets like the lack of a free agency, National Basketball Association players may have 
been in fact underpaid like Major League Baseball players were. In fact, scholars like Gerald 
Scully (1974) have determined that players are paid less relative to the amount of money they 
brought to their teams in the 1970’s. Scully compared the players’ marginal revenue products 
with their actual salaries, which should be equal if baseball was perfectly competitive, and found 
there to be an imbalance.6 Like the Major League Baseball, the removal of labor market 
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restrictions and addition of free agency has resulted in National Basketball Association players’ 
salaries more closely reflecting their value to their teams, according to studies by Cassing and 
Douglass (1980).7 Since scholars and fans have disagreed about the relative worth of players, it 
is important to note that there are differentiating factors that go into the calculation of a player’s 
salary.  
The idea that there is a constant tug and barter between players and owners about salary 
continues to be important even today. Bargaining agreements between players and owners are 
one of the main determinants of the size of the salary cap and ultimately how much players are 
paid. James R. Hill and Nicholas A. Jolly (2012) point to the 1998-1999 collective bargaining 
agreement as the year when there was an imposed a cap on individual salaries and team 
payrolls.8 The impetus that dove the imposed cap on salaries was Kevin Garnett. Hill and Jolly 
say that because Kevin Garnett, in only his second year, signed a new contract that made him the 
fourth highest player in the National Basketball Association, there were subsequent escalations 
to salaries.9 With growing salaries and costs, owners locked out the players and instituted the 
1998-1999 collective bargaining agreement. Players were no longer considered underpaid; the 
team owners believed that the players were overpaid. One consequence of the collective 
bargaining agreement was that because premier players had an artificial cap on salaries, the 
distribution of player salary relative to skill no longer matched. In Hill and Jolly’s research, they 
calculated the Theil and Gini, which serve to measure the economic inequality to analyze this 
issue. They found that the rookie scale in 1995 collective bargaining agreement with the 
introduction of the individual salary caps and the extension of the rookie scale in the 1998 
collective bargaining agreement actually created a more uniform distribution of income.10 This is 
an issue because now teams were paying players inefficiently. Neil Paine (2015) of Five Thirty 
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Eight also found this inefficiency. Paine compared the amount of wins a player added to the team 
and how much his salary was. He discovered that superstar players and rookies are paid far less 
than they deserve based on their skill levels while average rotation players were overpaid.11 The 
constant pull and tug from new collective bargaining agreement drives one factor of the salary 
distribution.  
Over the last decade or so, the quantitative shift has occurred in the National Basketball 
Association and in the basketball academic community, impacting the way people look at 
salaries. In 2006, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan Analytics Conference was 
created to discuss the role of analytics in sports. Quantitative research was one of the talking 
points about the importance for analyzing salaries. Now, the discussion revolves around how 
general managers assign value to players. Offensive statistics from box scores have typically had 
a higher correlation with how much a player is paid.12 One of the possible reasons for this 
phenomenon that offensive statistics are more correlated with salary is how difficult it is to 
isolate an individual player’s defensive impact. Kirk Goldsberry (2015) of Harvard University 
calls attention to this saying that previously it was difficult to analyze the defensive impact of a 
player with just traditional statistics unlike the more observable offensive statistics.13 Nuoya Li 
(2014) of Clemson University analyzed offensive and defensive statistics of players in contract 
years, in which players are playing for a new contract. In her study, she found that while many 
offensive statistics such as points and assists are individually significant to salary, only blocks 
are individually significant to salary.14 Other defensive statistics like steals and defensive 
rebounds are not individually significant in her research.15 This indicates that there is a positive 
relationship between scoring points and passing out assists with increased salary but there is not 
necessarily a relationship with an increase in salary for steals. Adam Fromal (2015) similarly 
	 6 
finds that if players increase their offensive percentile they get paid more, but this is not the case 
if players increase their defensive percentile.16 However, while Li and Fromal have found that 
offensive players have been compensated more for their observable statistics, not all scholars 
have agreed. Dan Rust, of University of Mississippi, found that certain defensive statistics, 
namely allowing points off post ups and pick and rolls are statistically significant to salary.17 
Currently, it seems that there are scholars who have found that offensive statistics do matter for 
players’ salaries but other scholars also argue that teams still do take into consideration defensive 
statistics when determining salaries.  
SIGNIFICANCE  
The premise for conducting this research is to shape the way people look at National 
Basketball Association salaries. Primarily, this research is conducted for the benefit of National 
Basketball Association front offices and general managers as they go through the decision 
making process for how to select free agents and to retain current players at what salary. 
Previously, they may have placed excessive emphasis on observable offensive box score 
statistics. With this research seeking to answer which player adds more expected wins, every 
general manager can more efficiently allocate their rosters. Specifically, after reading this 
research, teams gain knowledge on what specific statistics (offensive statistic, defensive statistic 
or a more holistic statistic encompassing both) lead to more wins. By doing so, general managers 
can easily compare players at the same position as well as against other positions. This is 
important as the salary cap makes it difficult for teams from spending as much as they want. 
Teams can be shrewd and spend their salary on two players that add more value to the team than 
one individual player at the same price. Furthermore, players, likewise, can use the research to 
gauge how much they are worth in free agency and through trade. The players’ union is also 
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integrally related to the players’ salaries, and they can use the research to effectively bargain 
with the league. Adam Silver, the commissioner, cares because he is face of the National 
Basketball Association. He has to plan accordingly to make the game as profitable for not only 
the owners but also placate the concerns of the players. Lastly, the research is interesting for 
other sport researchers and fans of the game who are enjoy looking at the quantitative 
complexities of free agency and trade transactions.    
When reading the research paper, people will have many expectations on the quantitative 
aspects of the paper. Firstly, as this is targeted primarily for practical use and secondarily for 
academic use, people will expect to see the most relevant and recent data. They expect to see 
data that comes from the last few years as teams are developing more analytical front offices. As 
the paper will be finished in April of 2016, National Basketball Association front offices and 
players would expect a guide that covers the National Basketball Association 2016-2017 season. 
Furthermore, the more quantitative scholarly audience will expect to see statistically significant 
correlations that create the foundation of the research.  
While there has been statistical analysis done on various determinants of salary, this 
research will also utilize those determinants to create a player salary guide that utilizes the most 
up to date traditional box score data and new statistical measures that is useful in determining 
current and future players’ salaries. The paper will not only cover if there is a relationship with 
certain player statistics with how much they make, but also how to combine the different 
statistics into a practical tool to use in free agency and trade negotiations. Also, this research can 
continue to add to the discussion on what type of statistics, namely if new created comprehensive 
statistics like Win Share (a statistical measure created to take into consideration of traditional 
offensive and defensive box score statistics like points, assists, rebounds, blocks and steals) and 
	 8 
Real Plus-Minus (a statistical measure that takes into consideration for quality of teammates into 
a player’s net point value while being on the court) have a greater impact on winning. This not 
only adds to the scholarly and academic discussion but also for general managers seeking to field 
a team.  
HYPOTHESIS 
Through this research’s analysis of previous studies, general managers and National 
Basketball Association teams seem to pay players more for observable offensive characteristics. 
Offensive statistics such as points per game may not be the best determinate for expected number 
of wins. The focus on paying players could be based more than just points, but rather defensive 
characteristics or a holistic advanced statistics that take into consideration the overall impact a 
player has on the court. The invention of more sophisticated analytical ratings such as Win 
Shares and Real Plus-Minus encompasses the overall impact a player has on the court and may 
show a greater correlation and statistically significant explanatory power with wins. If National 
Basketball Association general managers are not focusing on the right statistical determinants to 
increase winning, they are inefficiently allocating their salary cap on players.  
FRAMEWORK 
The research is quantitative in nature and employs statistical analysis, primarily through 
regression to find the correlations between certain statistics and wins. The league wide data 
comes from a public source, Basketball Reference. Basketball Reference not only provided the 
Win/Loss records for all thirty teams but also the box score and more advanced statistics. For the 
2013-2014 and 2014-2015 season, Basketball Reference provided the source for each team’s 
PS/G, PA/G, FG, FGA, FG%, 3P, 3PA, 3P%, 2P, 2PA, 2P%, FT, FTA, FT%, ORB, DRB, TRB, 
AST, STL, BLK, TOV, PF (Table 1). Basketball Reference did not include the team’s 
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accumulated advanced statistics, so to calculate the team’s advanced statistics, the sum was taken 
from each of the team’s players including PER, OWS, DWS, WS, OBPM, DBPM, BPM.  
METHODOLOGY  
To narrow the large set of data down to statistics that are most associated to wins, this 
research applies a correlation cutoff (Table 2). With the narrowed down set of variables, this 
research completed a multiple regression of certain team statistics (X variable) with wins (Y 
variable) to determine if they are statistically significant by utilizing t-tests at the 95% and 99% 
confidence interval. The data for league consists of the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 NBA seasons 
giving 60 total observations.  The regression is completed on JMP statistical software. The 
application of regression and t-tests for significance are common theoretical frameworks that are 
utilized by scholars like Rust and Li.  
After determining the team statistics that are statistically significant with winning, this 
research examines whether teams are compensating players according to those statistics. Using a 
similar process, a correlation cutoff is employed to narrow the data, which consists of the NBA 
2014-2015 NBA season. Then conducting a multiple regression of certain player statistics (X 
variable) with salary (Y variable) and examining the statistics that are statistically significant at 
the 95% and 99% confidence interval. By doing so, the research is making an implicit 
assumption that teams only care about winning and that teams do not consider external 
basketball factors like sponsorship and viewership.   
After finding the statistic with the highest statistically significant correlation to wins, this 
research builds a ratio that indicates how much a team should pay for a player. The formula that 
indicates how much a team should pay a player is Player Statistic*(Total Salary)/(Total Statistic). 
With each unit of individual player statistic, the player should be compensated by that ratio.  
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By calculating the efficient projected salary of players gives many interesting and 
practical results. This research is then able to analyze how efficient each team is at paying 
players. By sorting the players’ salaries by their respective teams, the projected salary of the 
team can be calculated. The teams with the lowest actual salaries minus the projected salaries 
indicate an ability to not overpay players and perhaps an ability to find good players at cheap 
price. The teams with the highest actual salaries minus projected salaries are teams that overpay 
their players to the detriment of their teams.   
RESULTS 
After narrowing down the data to statistics by correlations, only PS/G, FG%, 3P%, 2P%, 
Win Shares and DBPM have correlations of .6 after limiting variables due to possible 
collinearity (70%+ correlation with each other i.e. FG% and FGA). The multiple regression 
indicated that only Win Share is statistically significant at 99% confidence interval. 2P% and 
DBPM are statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval (Table 3).  
If teams are truly compensating players based on their added win contribution, then the 
salaries should be associated with Win Shares and possibly 2P% and DBPM. However, after 
narrowing down the data to statistics that had correlations greater than .6 only left MP, FG, 2P, 
FTA, DRB, TOV and PTS (Table 4). Win Share and DBPM at the league level showed 
explanatory power for wins did not have explanatory power for player salaries. After completing 
the multiple regression of salary against MP, FG, 2P, FTA, DRB, TOV and PTS, only MP, DRB 
and TOV are statistically significant (Table 5).  
 Win Share has the most explanatory power for wins based on it’s .9 correlation with wins 
and being statistically significant at 99% confidence interval, so this research paper utilizes it as 
the factor for determining efficient salary. To utilize Win Share into a useable formula, this 
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research uses the total salary divided by the total Win Share, 1256 to get $1.7 million/(Win 
Share), which means for every Win Share, a player is worth $1.7 million per year. For example, 
a 2 Win Share player is worth $3.4 million dollars per year in this current salary cap. Then 
applying this ratio throughout the NBA, each player will be paid accordingly. When the salary 
cap rises, teams can effectively annually adjust the ratio with new inputs for total salary cap and 
total Win Share. Teams then can utilize these projections to find undervalued players who are 
asking for less than the ratio says they deserve. Ideally finding a player that contributes more 
wins at a cheaper price.  
The calculation of the projected salaries for players clearly showed that teams are not 
compensating players effectively. To define whether or not players were not fairly compensated, 
there needed to be a criterion for not only the absolute difference but also the percentage 
difference (Table 6). Using 2 million dollars as an overpayment minimum as well as being paid 
25% more than the projected salary netted 95 players being overpaid. 2 million is a suitable 
amount as it puts into perspective the absolute amounts of money. Likewise, the 25% is a catch 
for players who make more significantly more than 10 million dollars, where 2 million is 
negligible. The top overpaid players by salary difference from projected and actual are Kobe 
Bryant, Amar’e Stoudemire, Carmelo Anthony, Derrick Rose and Joe Johnson (Table 7). There 
are 121 underpaid players who are being paid $2 million dollars less than their projected salary 
and 25% less than their projected salaries. The players who are exceeding their contracts are 
Anthony Davis, Jimmy Butler, Stephen Curry, Rudy Gobert, Damian Lilliard, and Draymond 
Green (Table 8). These players are producing more wins than their salary indicates they should. 
It’s important to note that most of these underpaid players are being paid on their rookie deal or 
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second deal. They are going to be paid much more in the future, for example Anthony Davis 
signed a five year, $145 million dollar contract.  
After sorting players by team, teams are sorted by their effectiveness in paying players by 
Win Shares. Atlanta did the best in allocating pay, overpaying their players by only $1,084,894. 
New York, Brooklyn and Los Angeles did the worst, overpaying their players by over $30 
million a year (Table 9). ESPN compiled a front office analytical ranking of NBA teams with 
four teams being all in on using analytics, eight teams being believers, nine being one foot in, six 
being skeptics on analytics and three being non believers. As expected, the more analytical the 
front office was based on ESPN’s ranking, the better it did on this research’s salary allocation 
projections. For example, all-in analytical offices average effectiveness is 10 but the non 
believers average effectiveness is 29 (Table 10). The all in and believers winning percentages are 
also higher than the one foot in, skeptics and non believers (Table 10).  
CONCLUSION 
Based on the results, it seems clear that some teams are not efficiently paying their 
players. The first multiple regression indicated that 2P% and DBPM are both statistically 
significant for winning percentage at the 95% confidence interval, Win Share is statistically 
significant at the 99% confidence interval. However, the second multiple regression indicates 
that teams are paying players based on MP, DRB and TOV. While initially this research 
hypothesized that teams compensating more based on observable offensive statistics, it’s actually 
not the case. The other takeaway is that teams are not compensating their players based on the 
statistics that are most associated with winning. With over 200 combined players that are either 
overpaid or underpaid, teams could do a better job scouting and analyzing players before giving 
contracts. What’s interesting is that teams who are efficiently compensating their players based 
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on this research’s model also tended to be ranked by ESPN as All-In and Believers of analytics. 
They also happen to have the better records in the NBA. This tends to indicate that the more 
analytical the front office is the more they subscribe to the type of analysis that this research 
conducted. With more teams implementing analytics into front offices, the inefficiencies should 
lessen. For now, this research is applicable to front offices looking to sign, trade and give 
contract extensions. To find underpaid players, it seems prudent to draft well and get players that 
perform in excess of what their salary dictates they should like Anthony Davis.  
There are certain statistical issues that this research may have when analyzing salaries. 
There may be collinearity issues when looking at different statistics that may also have a 
relationship with each other. Also, this research has to recognize that by projecting players’ Win 
Share, the focus is on a player’s past performance, not necessarily their future performance. As 
there are always going to be difficulties making forecasts, by using past performance there is at 
least something that builds the foundation for the forecasts.  																																																								
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1. Terms Definitions  
Box Score Statistics  Advanced  
W (Wins)  PER (Per Minute Efficiency)  
L (Losses)  OWS (Offensive Win Share) 
FG (Field Goals Made)  DWS (Defensive Win Share) 
FGA (Field Goals Attempted) WS (Total Win Share) 
FG% (Field Goal Percentage Made) OBPM (Offensive Box Plus/Minus) 
3P (3 Point Field Goals Made)  DBPM (Defensive Box Plus/Minus) 
3PA (3 Point Field Goals Attempted) BPM (Total Box Plus/Minus) 
3P% (3 Point Field Goal Percentage Made)   
2P (2 Point Field Goals Made)    
2PA (2 Point Field Goals Attempted)   
2P% (2 Point Field Goal Percentage Made)   
FT (Free Throws Made)    
FT (Free Throws Attempted)    
FT (Free Throws Percentage Made)    
ORB (Offensive Rebounds)   
DRB (Defensive Rebounds)    
TRB (Total Rebounds)    
AST (Assists)   
TOV (Turnovers)   
STL (Steals)   
BLK (Blocks)   
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2. Team Statistics’ Correlation with Winning Percentage 
 
Statistic Correlation with Winning Percentage 
PS/G 0.6 
PA/G -0.5 
FG 0.6 
FGA -0.1 
FG% 0.7 
3P 0.5 
3PA 0.4 
3P% 0.6 
2P 0.0 
2PA -0.4 
2P% 0.7 
FT 0.2 
FTA 0.0 
FT% 0.3 
ORB -0.3 
DRB 0.5 
TRB 0.2 
AST 0.5 
STL 0.1 
BLK 0.3 
TOV -0.3 
PF -0.3 
PER -0.1 
OWS 0.8 
DWS 0.7 
WS 0.9 
OBPM 0.3 
DBPM 0.6 
BPM 0.5 
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3. Multiple Regression for League 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>[t] Significance 
Intercept -56.5 21.0 -2.69 0.0096 * 
PS/G 0.0 0.2 0 0.9976 
 FG% -51.9 83.1 -0.63 0.5346 
 3P% 70.0 42.7 1.64 0.1074 
 2P% 134.9 62.5 2.16 0.0354 * 
WS 0.7 0.1 9.02 <.0001 *** 
DBPM 0.1 0.1 2.04 0.0461 * 
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4. Players Statistics’ Correlation with Salary 
 
Statistic Correlation with Salary 
Age 0.3 
G 0.3 
GS 0.5 
MP 0.6 
FG 0.6 
FGA 0.6 
FG% 0.2 
3P 0.2 
3PA 0.2 
3P% 0.1 
2P 0.6 
2PA 0.6 
2P% 0.2 
FT 0.6 
FTA 0.6 
FT% 0.1 
ORB 0.3 
DRB 0.6 
TRB 0.5 
AST 0.4 
STL 0.4 
BLK 0.3 
TOV 0.6 
PF 0.4 
PTS 0.6 
PER 0.5 
OWS 0.5 
DWS 0.4 
WS 0.5 
WS/48 0.3 
OBPM 0.4 
DBPM 0.1 
BPM 0.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
	
5. Player Multiple Regression 
 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>[t] Significance 
Intercept -15091 428275 -0.04 0.9719 
 MP -141356 49516 -2.85 0.0045 ** 
FG -292547 2073891 -0.14 0.8879 
 2P 375719 789910 0.48 0.6345 
 FTA -245081 523415 -0.47 0.6398 
 DRB 721479 174180 4.14 <.0001 *** 
TOV 1077575 394514 2.73 0.0065 ** 
PTS 546253 634507 0.86 0.3897 
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6. Sample Salary Calculations 
 
Actual Salary Projected Salary Difference % Player Salary 
$62,552 $502,266 ($439,714) -703% A.J. Price 
 $1,145,685 $5,524,924 ($4,379,239) -382% Aaron Brooks Underpaid 
$3,992,040 $1,674,219 $2,317,821 58% Aaron Gordon Overpaid 
$1,855,320 $0 $1,855,320 100% Adreian Payne 
 $12,000,000 $14,565,708 ($2,565,708) -21% Al Horford 
 $13,666,667 $7,868,831 $5,797,836 42% Al Jefferson Overpaid 
$1,276,061 $4,520,392 ($3,244,331) -254% Alan Anderson Underpaid 
$3,034,356 $2,846,173 $188,183 6% Alec Burks 
 $65,000 $0 $65,000 100% Alex Kirk 
 $3,649,920 $5,692,346 ($2,042,426) -56% Alex Len Underpaid 
$3,282,056 $3,683,282 ($401,226) -12% Alexey Shved 
 $981,084 $5,357,502 ($4,376,418) -446% Alexis Ajinca Underpaid 
$981,084 $5,524,924 ($4,543,840) -463% Al-Farouq Aminu Underpaid 
$862,000 $2,176,485 ($1,314,485) -152% Allen Crabbe 
 $1,063,384 $2,009,063 ($945,679) -89% Alonzo Gee 
 $23,896,658 $6,027,189 $17,869,469 75% Amar'e Stoudemire Overpaid 
$7,000,000 $8,538,518 ($1,538,518) -22% Amir Johnson 
 $9,704,595 $3,181,017 $6,523,578 67% Anderson Varejao Overpaid 
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7. Top 5 Overpaid Players 
 
Actual Salary Projected Salary Difference % Player Overpaid? 
$23,500,000 $334,844 $23,165,156 99% Kobe Bryant Overpaid 
$23,896,658 $6,027,189 $17,869,469 75% Amar'e Stoudemire Overpaid 
$22,458,000 $4,855,236 $17,602,764 78% Carmelo Anthony Overpaid 
$18,862,875 $2,009,063 $16,853,812 89% Derrick Rose Overpaid 
$23,180,790 $6,864,299 $16,316,491 70% Joe Johnson Overpaid 
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8. Top 5 Underpaid Players 
 
Actual Salary Projected Salary Difference % Player Underpaid? 
$5,607,240 $23,439,070 ($17,831,830) -318% Anthony Davis Underpaid 
$2,008,748 $18,751,256 ($16,742,508) -833% Jimmy Butler Underpaid 
$10,629,213 $26,285,243 ($15,656,030) -147% Stephen Curry Underpaid 
$1,127,400 $15,570,239 ($14,442,839) -1281% Rudy Gobert Underpaid 
$3,340,920 $17,746,724 ($14,405,804) -431% Damian Lillard Underpaid 
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9. Team Salary Allocation Effectiveness 
 
Team Effectiveness ESPN Ranking 
ATL 1 Believers 
PHO 2 One Foot In 
UTA 3 One Foot In 
POR 4 Believers 
DET 5 Believers 
PHI 6 All-In 
DAL 7 All-In 
SAS 8 All-In 
BOS 9 Believers 
DEN 10 Skeptics 
OKC 11 Believers 
LAC 12 Skeptics 
MIL 13 One Foot In 
MEM 14 Believers 
ORL 15 One Foot In 
CHA 16 One Foot In 
GSW 17 Believers 
TOR 18 One Foot In 
SAC 19 One Foot In 
HOU 20 All-In 
CHI 21 Skeptics 
NOP 22 Skeptics 
WAS 23 Skeptics 
CLE 24 Believers 
MIN 25 Skeptics 
IND 26 One Foot In 
MIA 27 One Foot In 
NYK 28 Non Believers 
BRK 29 Non Believers 
LAL 30 Non Believers 
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10. Average Salary Allocation Effectiveness Wins versus ESPN Rankings 
 
ESPN Ranking Average Effectiveness Average Wins 
All-In 10 45 
Believers 11 50 
One Foot In 15 38 
Skeptics 19 38 
NonBelievers 29 25 
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